Background
The annual accounts of the Bank of Tanzania (BOT), the Central Bank for the year 2005/2006 were under audit by Delloite and Touché -a multinational audit firm of high repute. In the course of this audit some suspicious transactions in the External Payment Arrears (EPA) Account came to the attention of the auditors and they brought these immediately to the attention of BOT's Executive Office. A number of these payments related to Kagoda Agriculture Limited -a company very selected few knew about. Following failure of the Governor (who was also the Chairman of the Board) to respond to concerns of Auditors the Lead Audit and Engagement Director found it necessary to formally bring the concerns to the attention of the entire Board of Directors, through the Chairman (with copies of the Auditor's letter sent to all board members). This letter to the Governor detailed a number of serious shortcomings in internal controls and approval mechanism of the payments to Kagoda Agriculture Limited. It pointed to existence of an elaborate fraudulent scheme perpetrated with active involvement of officials at the Central Bank. The Lead Audit and Engagement Director advised the Governor to immediately suspend all staff in the initiation and approval processes of the suspected fraud and immediately institute an investigation. A local investigative reporter had access to this letter and its contents were published in a national tabloid an extract of which is attached in Exhibit 1.
The Auditors were not convinced that the Board was addressing concerns they had communicated and the only feasible recourse the Lead Audit and Engagement Director had was to the Minister for Finance. Upon formal inquiry with the Minister for Finance and in what was later to have been acknowledged as a serious error of judgement the Minister for Finance actually wrote a letter of representation to the Auditors re-affirming the genuineness of the payments to Kagoda Agriculture Limited. Subsequently, it turned out that the Minister This case is based on real life events widely reported in public media that occurred at the BOT, the Central BOT. There has been no attempt to protect any physical locations, names of institutions or identities and to protect sources. Nevertheless, this case has been prepared solely to provide teaching material for class interactive discussions.
Disclaimer. This case is written solely for educational purposes and is not intended to represent successful or unsuccessful managerial decision making. The author/s may have disguised names; financial and other recognizable information to protect confidentiality. had solely relied on advice from the Governor of the Central Bank and the letter was appropriately recanted when the Minister was properly appraised. But the damage done was irreparable as when this information became public the common belief was that key players in high government offices were actively involved or had knowledge of the fraud [1] . In the end, and perhaps as a consequence of these developments the audit by Delloite and Touché was terminated by the Central Bank and therefore there was no formal audit report submitted. For a while this was the end of the matter -until 17 September 2007.
On that day at a public rally at Mwembe Yanga in Dar es Salaam a maverick Member of Parliament for an opposition party known as Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo Dr Willbroad Slaa announced a ''list of shame'' in which he mentioned individuals that allegedly had perpetrated massive fraud at the BOTand misappropriated EPA Account funds administered by the Central Bank on behalf of the government. He claimed to have obtained documentary evidence of some of the transactions. Soon thereafter some documents started to do rounds on the internet as attachments in e-mails. They made grim reading.
This sparked off an undercurrent of public misgivings on Government conduct that were subsequently echoed within the precincts of the parliament itself. The matter could no longer be ignored as an opposition party mudslinging campaign. The President ordered the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) to procure and contract an independent external investigator to conduct a special investigation of the EPA Account and submit a report within three months.
Ernst & Young, another multinational accounting firm was contracted to conduct the special investigation on behalf of the CAG and its Investigation Report was presented to the President on 7 January 2008. The report revealed that a total TAS. A total of 133 billion had been ''improperly'' paid out to 22 firms within only one financial year through the EPA Account. A day later President Jakaya Kikwete fired Dr Daudi Balali -the Governor of BOT.
Origins of EPA
EPA arose mostly during the 1980s and early 1990s when Tanzania was facing acute shortage of foreign currency to pay for normal imports. The government then instituted strict foreign exchange controls and mandated the Central Bank -the BOT to manage foreign currency reserves through prioritization of all foreign exchange payments.
Companies or individuals who needed to import plant, equipment, goods or services had to, in the first instance, deposit in full the Tanzanian shilling equivalent of the currency needed for imports. These deposits were made into a non-interest bearing External Payment Account at the National Bank of Commerce (NBC), at the time one of perhaps only two full service commercial banks in the country and wholly owned by the government. Upon receiving approval of the transaction from the BOT the NBC would then pay the foreign suppliers. The External Payment Account was therefore essentially a BOTaccount operated by the NBC.
The arrears occurred when payments in respect of Letters of Credit, Suppliers' Credits, or just direct payments for imports could not be honoured by NBC because of shortage of foreign exchange.
The Government of Tanzania assumed all responsibility for the outstanding debts from about 1985 and in the ensuing period instructed that management of the EPA Account be transferred from NBC to BOT. One of the rationales for establishment of a Debt Management Unit at the BOT was precisely to manage the settlement of EPA Account debts (see organization structure in Exhibit 1).
Following the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s, the abolition of the exchange control regime, and improvement in the government financial position and in the overall economy, there were increasing demands from the depositors to be paid. Some went to court and won exorbitant awards.
It is within this context that the government assumed the responsibility of repaying the depositors or whoever would have assumed the obligation. The BOT managed the scheme on behalf of the government. The settlement process is called de-pipelining because the Tanzanian shillings deposited would be paid back to the claimant and, in addition, the government would pay the topping up for the amount of the exchange loss since the deposit was made at NBC. This scheme had begun in mid-1996, following the issuance by the Treasury of a TAS. 100 billion bond.
Subsequently, the Government of Tanzania, with the support of the World Bank, settled some of the EPA Accounts through arrangements such as Debt Buyback, HIPCC Debt Reduction and the Paris Club Debt Cancellations. It is believed that by the end of 2004 when the Debt BuyBack programme was closed total debts of US$233 million were still outstanding (Table I) , most of which being time barred. A further nine companies received $42 million for which there was no documentation as to why they were paid at all. These were G&T International, Excellent Services Ltd, Mibale Farm, Liquidity Service Ltd, Clayton Marketing, Rashtas Ltd, Malegesi Law Chambers, Kiloloma and Brothers and Karnel Ltd The audit further revealed that registration documents of two companies were missing from the Business Registration and Licensing Authority (BRELA). These were Rashtas (T) Ltd and G&T International.
Genesis of the fraud
All transactions were facilitated by commercial banks through which funds were deposited and immediately withdrawn in bulk [2] . Table II 
Debt settlement processes and approval procedures
Prior to a Debt Assignee's delivery of the Deed of Assignment at the Central Bank substantial background work needed to have been undertaken. Information had to have been obtained on names and specific details of overseas creditors, the status of their claims and the amounts involved.
With this information collaborators would assess feasibility of specific claims on the basis of which companies were either registered or ''shell'' companies targeted for use as Debt Opening of bank accounts was subsequently facilitated by, or with the knowledge of, bank officials in preparation for disbursement, distribution and laundering of EPA Account funds.
In any case, a complete Deed of Assignment required inclusion of payment instructions which included bank account details.
The BOT on the other hand, had developed elaborate procedures on how settlements of EPA Account Debts were to be handled. These procedures started at the time of receipt of the Deed of Assignment as shown in Figure 1 that also indicates the key decision making points.
Since the BOT had, in the past ten years, grown to be a complex organization only a condensed organization structure is provided as Exhibit 2.
Receipt of the application
A beneficiary claimant (Debt Assignee) applied to the BOT, identifying a debt being claimed, with all necessary particulars. An assignee claimant must also produce a legally binding Deed of Assignment from the respective creditor. A scanned copy of an exhibit of a Deed of Assignment purported to have actually been submitted in one payment transaction is reproduced in Figure 2 .
Debt verification
On receipt of the application, the respective first point of entry at the Central Bank forwards the application to the Director Economic Policy (DEP) to take appropriate action. DEP directs the Deputy Director Debt Department (DDDD) to cause verification of the application and supporting documents.
The DDDD directs the Head of Bilateral and Commercial Debts (HBCD) division to verify/review the application and make comments and recommendations to DDDD.
HBCD examines the contents, compares and confirms with what is in the debt database at the BOT. If not in order HBCD returns the file to DDDD with comments. If in order HBCD forwards his comments and recommendations in the file to the DDDD.
The DDDD gives his comments and forwards the file to DEP through the Legal Department (Secretary to the Bank) who verifies the genuineness and the legal validity of the Deed of Assignment.
Review of the Deed of Assignment
The Secretary to the Bank reviews the Deed of Assignment. If it is not in order the Secretary to the Bank returns the file to DDDD with comments. If it is in order the Secretary to the Bank confirms the genuineness and validity of the Deed of Assignment and returns the file with the application to DEP to finalize the approval process.
Computation of amount payable
DEP instructs DDDD to compute the amount payable in Tanzanian shillings. DDDD in turn instructs HBCD to compute the amount payable in TZS and HBCD computes the amount payable and writes a memo to DDDD on the amount payable. DDDD submits computed amount payable and comments to DEP.
Submission of comments and recommendations to approving authority
DEP examines comments of the Secretary to the Bank and submits the file to the Governor, the approving authority, with recommendations, to approve payment.
Approval of debt de-pipelining
The Governor examines observations and recommendations from both DEP and the Secretary to the Bank and decides on the application. If it is not in order, the Governor sends the file back to DEP not approved.
If it is in order, the Governor approves de-pipelining of the deposit and the topping up for exchange loss to the recommended amount in Tanzania shillings and sends the file back to DEP for execution.
DEP now sends the application file to the Director of Finance (DF) for payment. 
Execution of payment
Upon verification of approval and instructions, the DF pays the amount payable in Tanzanian Shillings in accordance with instructions of the claimant.
Updating of debt records
DF sends the file back to DDDD who in turn sends the file to HBCD and cause him to erase the amount de-pipelined from relevant database. Once removed from the database it cannot be claimed. This obligation would now be completely settled and the file is sent back to the registry for archiving.
An exhibit illustrating the approval procedures Table III) .
We have verified the debts as per folios 8-11 and found them to be in order. We may advise the Governor to approve the request. However, the Ag. Secretary to the Bank should confirm the legality of the Deeds of Assignment appearing on Folios 3-6.
Figure
The acting DDDD on his part made an entry on the next day (Friday, 21 October 2005) and acting on advice in the box above to request the Secretary to the Bank to:
Kindly confirm the legality of the attached Deed of Assignment before we forward the request to the Governor for his consideration and approval. Please note the requested amount is still an outstanding in our records.
Again the acting Secretary to the Bank obliged the request on the same day (Friday, 21 October 2005) and reacted with the following comment: Other senior officials of the BOT in the decision making chain related to EPA Account debt payments were very apprehensive and a number had already been sent on paid compulsory leave.
Among these was the DF. He however, kept his routine of going into the City early morning after what had, for many years, become his habitual 06:00 a.m. church service. He would spend his entire day in an accounting firm run by his close friends who were former colleagues in his auditing days.
But today he felt tired and drained. He took himself to be a career accountant of good standing. From an audit background he had joined the Central Bank in 1996 as the Head of Internal Audit. He perceived himself as having enhanced sufficiently internal controls and the profile of the internal audit function within the Central Bank. It was from this position that he was moved to be the DF -a job that he cherished.
It is three months now since he was placed on compulsory paid leave to pave the way for the investigation to proceed. In his view he had no part in this fraud -he was merely implementing properly communicated instructions to execute payments -and that is the very same word employed in the operations procedures manual for de-pipelining. How could he afford not to execute approval instructions from the Governor? On occasions the Governor himself made follow-up on payments physically and on the phone. He was convinced that his role in these transactions came at the tail end. Officers in other directorates had gone through the applications and provided comments and recommendations that gave the Governor the basis for his approval decision. The lingering question in his mind was how could he be expected to start to question not only the Governor's approval but also all the input of Bank officers prior to the Governor's approval? 
Personal profile of Daudi Timothy Said Ballali
In 1965, BA in Economics, Howard University, Washington, DC; 1967, MA in Economics, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, 1967 -1976 , with the BOT: 1967 -1971 1971, Senior Economist; 1972, Acting Director, Research; 1972 -1976 1973 -1976 , Director, Research, 1976 -1997 1979 -1982 1982 -1986 , Senior Economist, working as Desk Economist, 1982 -1984 , Ghana, 1985 -1986 , Zimbabwe and 1984 -1985 1986 -1997 , Deputy Division Chief, heading IMF missions to negotiate economic reform programmes, supervise and monitor the implementation of these reforms; 1997, Adviser, 1997 Adviser, -1998 , Economic Adviser to the President, State House, Dar es Salaam. Since 1998, Governor, BOT (Source: BOT).
Notes
1. Indeed opposition party politicians have alleged in public meetings that some of the fraudulent transactions were perpetrated by high ranking CCM (the ruling party) operatives proceeds of which funded its re-election victory in 2005.
2. The short history of bank accounts opened when contrasted against the magnitudes of transactions which involved large cash withdrawals immediately after transfers from the Central Bank actually alarmed some of the commercial banks. One bank is reported to have sought additional clearance from the Central Bank on genuineness of a transfer. The Central Bank confirmed its validity but nevertheless, in compliance with its KYC principles and group banking practices the commercial bank actually returned the money to the Central Bank and closed the customer's account. This implies that all the foreign creditors travelled to sign these deeds on more or less the same day. A search of the immigration records might be necessary to determine whether or not this was so.
Keywords:
There are two Deeds of Assignment signed on 8 October (2005) relating to two German companies, namely, Lindeteves J Export BV and Hoechst for a total amount of e1, 164,402.76 . However, this currency was incorrect and the BOT wrote to Kagoda Agriculture Limited informing them that the correct currency should be Deutsche Marks. The same letter also advised of the release of TAS. 8, 196, 673, 600 .53/¼ to Kagoda Agriculture Limited. The latter company (Kagoda) submitted new Deeds of Assignment dated 3 November 2005 two days after being notified. We find it highly unusual and doubtful that a foreign creditor assigning such significant amounts of money would sign off for the wrong currency. In addition, it appears the bank (BOT) failed to institute an investigation when it picked up an anomaly with the currency. Instead, the same (BOT) later went on and released TAS. The letter to Ballali, signed by one Samuel Sithole in his stated capacity as Lead Audit and Engagement Director of Deloitte & Touché in South Africa, further notes that ''the use of old names for companies, and the speed with which the transactions were approved, could also suggest collusion with senior employees within the bank (BOT).''
Deloitte & Touché also expressed concern over how the Kagoda Agriculture Limited, formed on 29 September 2005, was ''able to be paid $30.8 m within five to six weeks of its formation.'' ''We are not aware of any background checks performed by the bank (BOT). It is also difficult to accept that the same company was able to negotiate and conclude contracts worth $30 m with separate foreign creditors from Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, England, France, the USA and Japan in this brief period'', said the letter.
The auditors advised Ballali to order ''an immediate and thorough investigation'' of the matter and suspend the BOT employees involved in the transactions for the period of the investigation, to avoid the possibility of files being tampered with.
However, no Central Bank employee has ever been suspended over the issue, and it was not until a year later that another auditing firm, Ernst & Young, was hired to audit payments made from the same BOT EPA account during 2005/2006.
The findings of this much-anticipated ''special audit'', conducted as a result of much prodding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and various donor countries, are yet to be made public.
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